Counter-insurgency—Lessons from a Professional in the Philippines , Frontlines of the
Global War on Terror
By Kent Clizbe
Demonstration of martial arts—Marine
Basic Trainees
Originally appeared in BigPeace; Aug.
23, 2010
The Marine officer is compact and solid. He wears his combat fatigues pressed, with a
neat crease in the upper sleeve. His
buzz-cut is sharp and clean. His clear
eyes, open expression, and intense gaze evidence intelligence and keen perception,
softened by his baby face. A better
specimen of Marine warrior is not likely to be found. But just a minute, this Marine is not in Jacksonville , or
Twenty-nine Palms. This fighter in the
Global War on Terror (GWOT) is a lieutenant in the Philippine Marine Corps (PMC). 1Lt. Romulo Dimayuga is taking part in a
demonstration of Marine tactics at the PMC training base in Ternate, Cavite , south of Manila .
©Kent Clizbe
1Lt. Romulo Dimayuga who led
anti-ASG combat patrol that killed Kaddafi Janjalani
Dimayuga led a platoon of Marines on a combat mission against
a superior force of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) combatants. Weeks after he returned from the jungle with
the remnants of his patrol (more than 50% of his men were killed or wounded in
the battle, and Dimayuga still carries a bullet in his belly) he learned that
his Marines had killed the then-leader of the ASG, Kaddafy Janjalani.
Kaddafy Janjalani
Overlooking Manila Bay , with a stunning view of the WWII American and
Filipino positions defending the Japanese onslaught at Corregidor, with the
Bataan peninsula looming in the far distance, the Filipino Marine base is
nestled in a series of coves chiseled into the volcanic ridges of Luzon island. The
Marines conduct their Basic training for enlisted, and indoctrination training
for officers in this rugged terrain.
©Kent Clizbe
Phil-Marine Force Recon practice
beach assaults in view of Corregidor and Bataan
Commandant of the PMC, Major General Juancho Sabban, chatted
with me during a break in the training demonstration. We talked about the Filipino military’s
successes in their hot war against the Al-Qaeda-linked ASG in the southern Philippines . He also commented on the theory and
application of Counter-Insurgency (COIN) strategy, based on his time in command
in Sulu Province .
©Kent Clizbe
Maj. Gen. Juancho Sabban
Sabban, a veteran of numerous combat operations against ASG
and Moro Liberation Front (MILF) fighters in the Muslim regions of the Philippines ,
spent a good portion of his military career stationed in the South. During much of that time, he was in active
combat operations. His first star was earned
battling the ASG in Sulu.
The anti-terrorist, anti-insurgency military operations in the
southern Philippines are similar
in many ways to the COIN operations the US
military is undertaking in Afghanistan
today. Filipino troops face a violent insurgent
threat in a tribal-based society in remote border regions inhabited by Islamic
cultures that value highly warfare against outsiders and infidels.
The battle for hearts and minds, in Sulu, however, has been,
arguably, much more effective than the battle in the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier. General Sabban explained that his COIN
operation, including working hand in hand with American units and civilian
partners, is heavy on infrastructure development. Sabban said he was asked by an American
Congressional delegation, which had been critical of the military operations,
to provide a wish-list for funding. The
Congressman was surprised to see that
Sabban’s list was not military equipment, but instead was requests for pumps,
docks, roads, schools, wells, and other infrastructure to improve the lives of
the inhabitants.
Sabban said that his country’s COIN strategy was making good
progress, with a few steps forward for every step back, like the recent suicide
bombing at the Zamboanga airport. Upon
reflection, he shared his belief that the difference between his COIN
operations, and America ’s
faltering progress in Afghanistan
could be due to a difference in the political landscape of the southern Philippines and Afghanistan .
Sabban and I discussed the difference between complete control
of an area, politically, economically, militarily, as the Republic of the Philippines enjoys in Sulu, and the U.S. situation in Afghanistan . While the U.S.
must contend with a morally bankrupt, corrupt, ineffective and inept Afghan
government, in order to win support from NATO and other allies, the Philippines
owns the territory of its battle in Sulu.
Although the island chain is nominally a part of the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao, the Philippine government is the ultimate power, officially
and in reality.
With no need to pretend that the locals are in control, and
no need to make a show of local buy-in with either military or social
operations, the PMC and its Filipino military brethren, are free to operate as necessary. But the most important ingredient is
operating in a way that earns the respect of the populace. That requires exhibiting strength and
manliness, maybe more than America
is prepared to display publicly. The
Muslim tribal culture respects adversaries and overlords who are strong and, to
some extent, ruthless. That’s
right—sometimes hearts and minds follow where the short-hairs are led. The approach must be determined by the target
culture, not by the aggressor culture.
©Kent Clizbe
Force Recon Marines discuss results
of exercise
Only with culturally aware, socio-politico-economic-military total
control of an insurgent region can a true COIN battle for hearts and minds be
successful. As the United States proved nearly a hundred years ago,
on the same ground that Filipino and American forces stand side by side in the
Global War on Terror in Mindanao and Sulu
today, complete colonial-style control
of an insurgent territory is necessary for the success of COIN operations.
Kent Clizbe, a former CIA
operations officer, specializes in Southeast Asia
and counter-terrorism. He worked in the Philippines from 1982 to 1985, as a linguist at Clark AB ; and from 1987
to 1988, as a supervisor at the American
Refugee Processing
Center at Bataan . He participated in the anti-terrorism,
hostage rescue operations, joint training task force, Balikatan, in Zamboanga, Mindanao , in early 2002.
For more comments and analysis see his website: www.kentclizbe.com
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